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Abstract: 
 
The objective of this study is three-fold. First we estimate and analyse bank efficiency and 
productivity changes in the EU28 countries with the application of a novel approach, a 
weighted Russell directional distance model. Second, we take a disaggregated approach and 
analyse the contribution of the individual bank inputs on bank efficiency and productivity 
growth. Third, we test for convergence in EU28 bank productivity as well as in the inefficiency 
of individual bank inputs. We find that bank efficiency has been undermined by the financial 
crisis in banks notably from the EU15 countries. We also argue that bank efficiency and 
productivity in EU countries vary across the banking sector with banks from the ‘old’ EU 
showing higher efficiency levels. Nonetheless, a noticeable catching up process is observed for 
banks from the ‘new’ EU countries. Consequently, we do not find evidence of group 
convergence for bank productivity but there is evidence of convergence in bank efficiency 
change and technical change among the EU28 countries throughout the period 2005-2014. The 
driving force seems to be convergent technical change from the old EU Member States’ banks. 
On the other hand, almost no convergence is detected for the banks’ individual inputs while 
the transition paths show heightened diversity during the crisis years. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been extensive research on bank efficiency either on individual EU countries or on 
the group of EU countries that include ‘old’ EU15 and/or new EU countries, see for example, 
Berger, (2003), Goddard et al. (2007), Barros et al. (2007), Fries and Taci (2005), Casu and 
Girardone (2006), Chortareas et al (2012; 2013), Matousek et al (2014), among others.  
The focal point of these empirical studies has been to find evidence on the degree of 
European banking markets integration. A large number of studies have specifically analysed 
differences at bank efficiency levels across the EU countries. Casu and Molyneux (2003), in 
their early study on bank integration, conclude that there is evidence that EU banks have 
converged. Similar results are reported by Barros at al. (2007), who stress upon the importance 
of country-level characteristics on bank performance. Goddard et al. (2007), on their part, argue 
that the integration process has implications for systemic risk and as such constitutes a 
challenge to the supervisory and regulatory framework. Following the most recent financial 
crisis, bank performance, particularly, in the ‘old’ EU countries have been affected by the 
adverse economic environment. As widely reported, governments and Central Banks across 
EU countries have had to bail out a large number of commercial banks in order to avoid a 
systemic crisis. In 2009, European governments approved $5.3 trillion of aid, a staggering 
amount representing more than the annual gross domestic product of Germany, to support 
banks during the credit crunch (Bloomberg, 2009). 
This unique and unprecedented event motivates our research on the analysis of EU28 bank 
performance and convergence before, during, and after the crisis. We attempt to extend the 
current literature on the European banking markets by examining technical efficiency and 
productivity change in the EU 28 banking sector during the period 2005-2014. Hence, this 
study tries to shed light on bank performance during the financial crisis and in its aftermath.  
Furthermore, as far as we are aware, there is rather limited up to date research on bank 
efficiency in EU countries that takes into account the current disturbances in the banking 
markets. Indeed, most studies on bank efficiency discuss findings that pre-date the crisis (see 
Altunbas (2001), Casu and Molyneux (2003), Casu and Girardone (2006), Goddard et al 
(2007), Barros et al (2007), Brissimis et al. (2010) among others). Our study not only addresses 
the above-mentioned gap but we also advance the methodological approach on how to estimate 
bank efficiency. We extend the current methodology introduced by Barros et al (2012) by 
introducing allocative efficiency and cost efficiency. We also open the black-box on how 
efficiency and productivity are measured. 
In so doing, we analyse, in a unique way, how the individual inputs and outputs affect 
overall bank efficiency and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) change. This type of examination 
is key for regulators and banks. It reveals and clearly identifies the fundamental managerial 
problems at the core of banks and the banking system. So far, a few studies have focused on 
these important issues, e.g. Barros et al. (2012) and Assaf et al. (2013). Our findings may guide 
regulators and bank managers in adopting measures that would re-establish a well-functioning 
banking system in the analysed countries.   
The contributions of this study are listed as follows: First, we investigate the link between 
bank allocative and technical efficiency. Second, our approach enables us to measure the 
contribution effect on TFP of each inputs. Crucially, the disaggregation of technical efficiency 
into individual inputs is an addition to contemporary research on bank performance. Third, we 
test for convergence in productivity growth as well as in the individual bank inputs of the EU28 
banks to assess the integration process within the EU28 banking sector. We employ the 
dynamic Phillips and Sul (2007) panel convergence model which allows for individual 
heterogeneity while testing for a common growth component. Fourth, the empirical analysis is 
new in the context of bank efficiency and productivity changes together with convergence in 
new EU countries. The analysis is particularly relevant given the ongoing consolidation process 
in EU countries. Accordingly, we investigate the period 2005 to 2014. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of European banking 
literature. Section 3 discusses the methodology and Section 4 presents the empirical results. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
2.1. An Overview: European Banking System and the Global Financial Crisis 
In the last twenty years, the European banking market has undergone extensive regulatory 
changes, consolidation through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and important technological 
changes that have considerably changed the banking industry. The implementation of the First 
Banking Coordination Directive in 1977 followed by the EU White Paper in 1985 and the 
Second Banking Coordination Directive of 1988 provided a cornerstone for the establishment 
of the Single Market for Financial Services in 1993. The Cecchini Report (1998), which 
analysed the cost-benefit analysis of a single financial market, argued that a single financial 
market reduces the costs of financial intermediation, enables more efficient allocation of 
capital, better access to markets, instrument and services and higher efficiency of the financial 
institutions and markets. The benefit of a single market was seen, above all, as an increase in 
competition that will lower the prices of financial services.  
Undoubtedly, the European banking markets has, since, been significantly reshaped and 
the degree of harmonisation has improved compared to the pre-1993 level. Berger (2003) 
argues that the full efficiency effect of a single market for financial services in Europe would 
require an intensive wave of mergers and acquisitions of financial institutions across the 
countries. However, he reports that there have been a rather limited number of M&As among 
the EU financial institutions. Furthermore, Berger (2003) shows that universal banking in 
particular, can contribute to scope efficiency and cost improvements. Goddard et al (2007) 
argue that the integration of the banking sector has not been achieved yet. The main obstacles 
of the full integration are national economic conditions, differences in legal and fiscal system, 
and cultural differences, among others. Barros et al (2007) support this view in their study by 
showing that country-level characteristics (location and tradition), firm-level features (bank 
ownership, balance sheet structure and size) still matter. They also argue that smaller sized 
banks with higher loan intensity and foreign banks from countries with common low traditions 
have a higher chance of best performance. Other studies shows that the process of integration 
has advanced more in wholesale rather than in retail banking, see, for example, Cabral et al. 
(2002), Barros et al. (2005). 
The most recent global financial crisis has been, to some extent, a test of the degree of 
financial integration across the EU countries. With the benefit of hindsight, it is now evident 
that the financial crisis has seriously jeopardised the process of financial integration. As stated 
by the ECB (2012), financial integration affects financial stability through a variety of channels 
and can become a conduit transmitting financial shocks and contagion during crisis time. 
Empirical analysis, not surprisingly, finds strong evidence that bank balance-sheet contagion 
has indeed been amplified by the exposure of borrowing from cross-border banks (ECB, 2012). 
To our knowledge, there are no empirical studies that investigate the impact of the current 
global financial crisis on bank efficiency across all EU28 banks1. 
The cost of the financial crisis in terms of aid provided by EU states to stabilise the EU 
banking during 2008 and 2012 amounted to EUR 1.5 trillion, a sum equivalent to 12.3% of EU 
2012 GDP (European Commission, 2014). The crisis has disclosed the bottlenecks of the 
integration process. The main weakness of the integration process has been a weak and not 
fully implemented integrated framework for bank supervision and regulation. This is evident 
                                                          
1 Matousek et al (2014) analyse the impact of the global financial crisis on EU15’s bank efficiency.  
from the systemic crisis we have witnessed across the individual EU countries. Furthermore, 
the extent of the crisis has spread across the EU countries through the balance sheets of 
financial institutions. As a result, a number of banks have been forced to sell external assets or 
been required to close their exposure with domestic and/or overseas institutions. Such activities 
then spread from one bank to another regardless of the geographical frontier. 
Tsionas et al. (2015) discuss the cost of restructuring the banking sector in EU. For 
example, the UK’s estimated package should reach US $1.1 trillion in order to restore 
confidence in the banking system. In Denmark, 13 of the country’s 140 banks were bailed out 
by the central bank or acquired by their competitors. The expected volume of the rescue 
package is estimated to be EUR 593.9 billion. EU governments approved about EUR 311.4bn 
for capital injections, EUR 2.92tr for bank liability guarantees, EUR 33bn for relief of impaired 
assets and EUR 505.6bn for liquidity and bank funding support, a total of EUR 3.77tr. 
It is evident that international financial integration increases economic efficiency and 
growth. However, it may also increase the probability of a systemic banking crisis by 
transmitting international shocks via bank balance sheets. As already mentioned above, our 
analysis has important policy making implications. In particular, it should disclose the weakest 
links in the banking integration process in EU 28countries as well as the contagion channels 
that undermine bank performance.  
 
2.2. Literature Review 
The enlargement of the European Union to 28 member countries has been a significant 
step in the history of the European Union and the ramifications in terms of the integration 
process are profound. In theory, a single market in banking across the 28 member states should 
enable greater consumer choice and boost competition and banking efficiency. Indeed, if a 
homogenous banking market and competition do lead to further integration, then the impact 
would be felt on the cost structures and performance of banks (i.e. banking efficiency). As 
noted by Kasman et al. (2010), the new EU member countries embarked on large-scale 
privatisation programmes in the mid-1990s in order to boost banking competition and 
efficiency. As a result, bank consolidation among the Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries peaked in the 2000s and the countries’ banking systems are now more viable and 
efficient (Kasman et al, 2010). Hence a higher level of competition and the presence of an 
integrated market should translate into convergence in banking efficiency.  
There are several studies that investigate the process of European banking integration by 
using banking efficiency as an indicator for integration (Goddard et al. 2007; Brissimis et al. 
2010, Fiordelisi et al. 2011; Weill 2009, Casu and Molyneux 2003; Casu and Girardone 2010.). 
All these studies, however, focus on the performance of EU15’s banks prior to the financial 
crisis. For instance, Casu and Molyneux (2003) investigate whether productive efficiency in 
European banking for the period 1993 and 1997 has converted to a common European frontier. 
Their results point to an improvement in the average efficiency scores, but the efficiency gap 
between the countries has widened over this period. They conclude that there is little evidence 
of convergence. 
Weill (2009) applies the beta and sigma convergence test2 to estimated cost efficiency 
scores3 for banks from ten4 European countries for the period 1994 to 2005. Weill (2009), on 
the other hand, finds evidence in support of convergence in cost efficiency in the EU banking. 
Similar results are also found by Casu and Girardone (2010), who apply the same methodology 
to test for convergence in the EU15’s banks during the period 1997 to 2003. The authors find 
                                                          
2 The β-convergence is drawn from the growth literature and models the “catch-up effects” by regressing the 
growth rate of a variable on the initial level while σ-convergence looks at the dispersion of the cross-section. 
Convergence is evident is the dispersion decreases over time. See Rughoo and Sarantis (2012) for a comparison 
of this methodology with the Phillips and Sul method. 
3 Estimated through the stochastic frontier approach 
4 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, UK 
evidence of bank efficiency convergence and report that the introduction of the single currency 
has had no effect on the convergence and improvement in efficiency levels in the EU15 
countries. The authors find no evidence of group convergence following the onslaught of the 
global financial crisis. 
Kasman et al. (2013), on their part, analyse the convergence of total factor productivity 
within EU22 countries using the concepts of β-convergence and σ-convergence over the period 
1995 to 2006 and find evidence of convergence. To sum up, an overview of the studies on bank 
efficiency and convergence reveals a significant gap in the literature. There is a clear lack of 
studies that encompass banks from all the EU28 countries over a recent period of time that 
includes the financial crisis. We aim to address both lacunas in our paper with an extensive 
analysis of bank productivity across EU28 banks and the application of robust methodologies.  
 
3. Methodology 
This study measures allocative efficiency of input resources and productivity change in the 
European banking sector. In productivity change estimation, we decompose TFP by 
contribution effects of each input/output. Additionally, we apply the convergence test to 
analyse the time trend. 
We apply two non-parametric productive efficiency estimation methods, the data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) and the weighted Russell directional distance model (WRDDM). 
We apply DEA to evaluate input resource allocative efficiency, and WRDDM to measure TFP 
and contribution effects of each input/output factor. Both nonparametric approaches propose a 
measure based on linear programming and have advantages of being relatively easy in treating 
multiple input and output data. Such a model helps achieve our research objectives which 
include examining how inputs are allocated in bank production process between the old and 
new EU countries. We also focus on the impact of the changes of individual input on bank 
productivity by considering their contribution effect. This is a novel approach, which has not 
hitherto been applied in recent studies on European bank efficiency (productivity). 
 
3.1 Data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
3.1.1. Technical efficiency of input resource use 
Many productivity evaluation techniques are based on the frontier efficiency concept originally 
proposed by Farrell (1957) to evaluate inefficiency by specifying the production frontier with 
the best performing observations, and measuring the distance of inefficient samples from the 
frontier. DEA approach was developed by Charnes et al. (1978), wherein nonparametric linear 
programming techniques are applied. 
Let 𝑥 ∈ ℜ+
L , 𝑦 ∈ ℜ+
M be vectors of inputs and output, respectively, and then define the 
production technology as: 
𝑃(𝑥) = {𝑦: 𝑥 𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒 𝑦} (1) 
DEA can compute technical efficiency (TE) of input resource use for bank k by solving 
the following optimization problem: 
𝑇𝐸𝑘 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝜃𝑘, (2) 
s.t.                  ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑙𝑁
𝑖=1 ≤ 𝜃𝑘𝑥𝑘
𝑙                          𝑙 = 1,⋯ , 𝐿 (3) 
                 ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑚𝑁
𝑖=1 ≥ 𝑦𝑘
𝑚                          𝑚 = 1,⋯ ,𝑀 (4) 
                 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0                                              𝑖 = 1,⋯ ,𝑁 (5) 
where l and m represent types of input and output, respectively. x is an input matrix with 
dimensions L  N and y is a output matrix with dimensions M  N. 𝜃𝑘 is the technical efficiency 
score of the bank k which is defined from zero to one, and 𝜃𝑘 = 1 signifies a bank is efficient. 
i is the weight variable. To estimate the technical efficiency score of all banks, the model 
needs to be applied independently to each of the N banks. 
 In general, the DEA model commonly assumes either constant return to scale (CRS) or 
variable return to scale (VRS). Equation (2) to (5) represents DEA model under CRS 
assumption. Ramanathan (2003) explains that VRS assumption takes into account the variation 
of efficiency with respect to the scale of operation, and hence measures pure technical 
efficiency. On the other hand, CRS assumption can be made to evaluate efficiency comprising 
pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. DEA model under VRS assumption can be 
estimated by applying equation (2) to (5) and the following equation (6). 
 
∑ 𝜆𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 = 1                                                                        (6) 
By using productive efficiency score estimated by DEA under CRS and VRS assumption, 
scale efficiency score can be estimated. Scale efficiency is defined as following equation.  
Scale efficiency = TECRS / TEVRS                                        (7) 
According to Ramanathan (2003), scale efficiency indicates how each bank scale’s is 
close to the most productive scale size (MPSS) which enjoys the maximum possible economy 
of scale. Scale efficiency equal to one signals that the bank is identified as at the MPSS. 
 
3.1.2. Cost and allocative efficiency of input resource use 
In the previous Section, technical efficiency is defined by each input and each output ratio. 
However, the decision-makers of banks focus on total input cost efficiency to evaluate their 
financial performance, especially the balance of the input resource. In this case, an objective 
efficiency score is needed to consider the balance of multiple input resources. 
As stated by Coelli et al. (2002), cost efficiency and allocative efficiency can be estimated 
by DEA.5 The cost efficiency evaluates how much total input costs can be decreased without 
decreasing output. To estimate cost efficiency, the following cost minimisation program is 
calculated. Cost minimisation program of bank k can be described as follows.  
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 ∑ {𝑝𝑘
𝑙 𝑥𝑘
∗𝑙}𝐿𝑙=1  (8) 
s.t.               ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑙𝑁
𝑖=1 ≤ 𝑥𝑘
∗𝑙                             𝑙 = 1,⋯ , 𝐿 (9) 
               ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑚𝑁
𝑖=1 ≥ 𝑦𝑘
𝑚                          𝑚 = 1,⋯ ,𝑀 (10) 
               𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0                                             𝑖 = 1,⋯ ,𝑁 (11) 
where 𝑝𝑙 is an input price variable which is given and fixed. Input price can be different 
among type of input variables (l). 𝑥𝑘
∗𝑙 is optimal input amount to minimize total input cost. The 
score of 𝑥𝑘
∗𝑙  is equal to or less than 𝑥𝑘
𝑙 . Cost efficiency (CE) of bank k can be defined as equation 
(12) by using the result from the cost minimization program. CE is calculated as minimized 
total input cost divided by the actual total input cost.  
𝐶𝐸 = ∑𝑝𝑘
𝑙 𝑥𝑘
∗𝑙
𝐿
𝑙=1
∑𝑝𝑘
𝑙 𝑥𝑘
𝑙
𝐿
𝑙=1
⁄                                                           (12)
 
 
By using TE and CE, we can estimate allocative efficiency (AE). Allocative efficiency 
evaluates the allocation of input resources and is described by equations (13) and (14). The 
score of AE is defined from zero to one, and AE equal to one signifies that the input resource 
                                                          
5 Cost efficiency can be estimated by both DEA and WRDDM. However, theoretical background of allocative efficiency estimation as CE/TE 
is constructed in DEA model but not WRDDM. On the other hands, contribution effect to TFP change can be estimated by WRDDM but not 
DEA.  To discuss both allocative efficiency and contribution effect of input factors to TFP change, we apply two linear programing methods 
which are DEA and WRDDM. 
allocation is efficient. AE<1 means that the input resource allocation is inefficient. AE can be 
estimated under CRS and VRS assumption as follows. 
 
AECRS = CECRS / TECRS       (13) 
AEVRS = CEVRS / TEVRS       (14) 
 
3.2 Weighted Russell Directional Distance Model (WRDDM) 
WRDDM is developed by Chen et al. (2015) and Barros et al. (2012). Generally, the production 
frontier analysis evaluates productive inefficiency score by measuring the distance between the 
production frontier line and each banking firm. In WRDDM estimation, weighted inefficiency 
score D⃗⃗ (𝑥𝑘, 𝑦𝑘|g) can be estimated by using the distance measured by multiple viewpoints 
which are inefficiency of output (𝛼𝑘
𝑚) and inefficiency of input (𝛽𝑘
𝑙 ). Equation (15) to (18) 
represent the WRDDM for the inefficiency score of bank k: 
 
D⃗⃗ (𝑥𝑘, 𝑦𝑘|g) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 (𝑤𝑦 ∑ 𝜔𝑦
𝑚𝛼𝑘
𝑚 +𝑀𝑚=1 𝑤𝑥 ∑ 𝜔𝑥
𝑙 𝛽𝑘
𝑙𝐿
𝑙=1 )    (15) 
 
Subject to 
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑚 ≥ 𝑦𝑘
𝑚 + 𝛼𝑘
𝑚g𝑦𝑘
𝑚
𝑁
𝑖=1           𝑚 = 1,⋯ ,𝑀 (16) 
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑙 ≤ 𝑥𝑘
𝑙 − 𝛽𝑘
𝑙 g𝑥𝑘
𝑙
𝑁
𝑖=1                 𝑙 = 1,⋯ , 𝐿 (17) 
𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0                                                 𝑖 = 1,⋯ ,𝑁 (18) 
 
D⃗⃗ (𝑥𝑘, 𝑦𝑘|g) represents the aggregated inefficiency score of bank k and defined from zero 
to one. D⃗⃗ (𝑥𝑘, 𝑦𝑘|g) = 0 means that bank k is efficient and a larger score shows more inefficient 
performance. 𝜆𝑖  is the intensity variable to determine the shape of the frontier line. According 
to Chen et al. (2015),WRDDM can evaluate the inefficiency of each input and output factors 
while considering the characteristics of each factor. 
The 𝑤𝑦 and 𝑤𝑥 are given priorities associated with the output and input variables. Because 
the objective of this research is to clarify the efficiency of individual input factor, we apply the 
input-oriented WRDDM model with setting (𝑤𝑦=0, 𝑤𝑥=1). Additionally, the 𝜔𝑦
𝑚 and 𝜔𝑥
𝑙  are 
given priorities associated with the data variables among each of the outputs and the inputs. 
According to Chen et al. (2015), equal data weight setting has the advantage to understand the 
inefficiency score estimated WRDDM. This is because equal weights allow inefficiency scores 
not to be affected by the number of data variables. Therefore, we set the priority weights as 
equal (i.e. 𝜔𝑙
𝑥=1/L). 
Additionally, g𝑥𝑘
𝑙  is a directional vector which defines the way of distance measure from 
each bank to the production frontier line. We choose the proportional directional vector which 
has the advantage of calculating the productivity change indicator. By applying the 
proportional directional vector as g𝑥𝑘
𝑙 = 𝑥𝑘
𝑙 , the WRDDM is shown as follows: 
 
D⃗⃗ (𝑥𝑘, 𝑦𝑘|g) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 (
1
𝐿
∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝑙𝐿
𝑙=1 )                                         (19) 
Subject to 
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑚 ≥ 𝑦𝑘
𝑚𝑁
𝑖=1                   𝑚 = 1,⋯ ,𝑀           (20) 
∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑙 ≤ 𝑥𝑘
𝑙 (1 − 𝛽𝑘
𝑙 )𝑁𝑖=1       𝑙 = 1,⋯ , 𝐿            (21) 
𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0                                            𝑖 = 1,⋯ ,𝑁                          (22) 
 
The proportional directional vector, as set above, measures the distance from each bank to 
the frontier line by focusing on how much each bank can decrease its input factors. The 
advantage of the proportional directional vector is that it yields a straightforward interpretation 
of the inefficiency score. The inefficiency score illustrates the percentage by which each bank 
can decrease their input in relation to the frontier line. Therefore, a proportional directional 
vector allows the inefficiency score to be independent from the unit of data. Additionally, a 
proportional directional vector has also the advantage of deciphering TFP change and the 
contribution effect of each variables. Notably, the contribution effect estimated by proportional 
directional vector directly represents the percentage of production inefficiency change. 
Similar to the DEA model, WRDDM can be set up under the CRS and VRS assumption. 
Equation (19) to (22) display WRDDM under CRS assumption. WRDDM under VRS 
assumption can be estimated by applying equation (19) to (22) and the restriction for 𝜆 
expressed in equation (6). 
According to Fujii et.al. (2014) and Fujii et al. (2015), total factor productivity (TFP) 
change and the contribution effect of each input/output factor into TFP change can be estimated 
by using the inefficiency score of the WRDDM. This study employs the Luenberger 
Productivity Indicator as a TFP measure because the Luenberger Productivity Indicator has the 
advantage over productivity change estimation due to the additive distance function model 
compared to the Malmquist productivity index (Balk et al., 2008). 
To better understand the structure of TFP change, Färe et al. (1994) developed the 
decomposition of TFP into technical change (TECHCH) and efficiency change (EFFCH). TFP 
estimated by WRDDM and Luenberger productivity indicator is represented as follows: 
 
TFPt
t+1 =
1
2
{D⃗⃗ t+1(𝑥𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑘
𝑡) − D⃗⃗ t+1(𝑥𝑘
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑘
𝑡+1) + D⃗⃗ t(𝑥𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑘
𝑡) − D⃗⃗ t(𝑥𝑘
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑘
𝑡+1)}
 
(23) 
TECHCHt
t+1 =
1
2
{D⃗⃗ t+1(𝑥𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑘
𝑡) + D⃗⃗ t+1(𝑥𝑘
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑘
𝑡+1) − D⃗⃗ t(𝑥𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑘
𝑡) − D⃗⃗ t(𝑥𝑘
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑘
𝑡+1)} (24) 
EFFCHt
t+1 = D⃗⃗ t(𝑥𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑘
𝑡) − D⃗⃗ t+1(𝑥𝑘
𝑡+1, 𝑦𝑘
𝑡+1)
 
(25) 
TFPt
t+1 = TECHCHt
t+1 + EFFCHt
t+1 (26) 
 
Where 𝑥𝑡 shows the input for year t, 𝑥𝑡+1 represents the input for year t+1, 𝑦𝑡 is the output 
for year t, and 𝑦𝑡+1 is the output for year t+1. D⃗⃗ t(𝑥𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑘
𝑡)is the productive inefficiency in year 
t evaluated by using production frontier line in year t. Similarly, D⃗⃗ t+1(𝑥𝑘
𝑡 , 𝑦𝑘
𝑡)  is the 
inefficiency of year t evaluated by using production frontier line in year t+1. The TFP can be 
decomposed into TECHCH and EFFCH as shown in equation (26). 
By using input oriented WRDDM, we have a further decomposition of TFP. From Fujii et 
al. (2014) and Fujii et al. (2015), TFP can be decomposed into each variables’ contribution 
effect as follows.  
 
TFPt
t+1 = ∑ TFPt,𝑥𝑙
t+1
𝑙        (27) 
TECHCHt
t+1 = ∑ TECHCHt,𝑥𝑙
t+1
𝑙             (28) 
EFFCHt
t+1 = ∑ EFFCHt,𝑥𝑙
t+1
𝑙       (29) 
 
TFPt,𝑥𝑙
t+1 shows the contribution effect of inputs factor 𝑙 for TFP change. So by considering 
the contribution effect indicator, we can comprehend the reasons why TFP has changed by 
analysing each input’s performance change. 
 
3.3 Convergence in productivity change 
We employ the dynamic panel method, Phillips and Sul (2007) convergence methodology, to 
test for convergence in the estimated total factor productivity, efficiency change and technical 
change as well as in the inefficiency of 3 individual inputs, namely personnel expenses, total 
fixed assets and total deposits. We consider all the banks in our sample of EU28 banks as well 
as, separately, banks from the EU15 countries and from the new EU countries respectively. 
This model is a regression-based panel convergence methodology which analyses co-
movements and convergence in the context of individual heterogeneity and the evolution of 
this heterogeneity across different groups and over time. So this approach has the benefit of 
testing for convergence within a heterogeneous setup that allows for a wide range of possible 
time paths.  
The Phillips and Sul approach addresses the concept of transitional heterogeneity by 
working with the relative transition coefficients, hit, which represents the share of each bank’s 
productivity indicator or inefficiency score, yit, relative to the cross-section average 
productivity indicator or inefficiency score in the panel (ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖𝑡/𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ). Using the 
relative transition coefficients, Phillips and Sul (2007) propose a regression based ‘logt’ test6 
as follows: 
Log 
𝐻1
𝐻𝑡
− 2 log(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡) = 𝑎 + 𝛾 log 𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡, for t = 𝑇0, … . . , 𝑇    (30) 
 
Where 𝐻𝑡 = 𝑁
−1 ∑ (ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 1)
𝑁
𝑖=1
2 and 𝛾 measures the speed and magnitude of convergence. 
The test statistic is normally distributed and using the 5% significance level, the null hypothesis 
of convergence is rejected if the test statistic is < -1.65. Additionally, If 𝛾 ≥ 2, convergence in 
the level productivity indicators or inefficiency scores is present whereas if 2 > 𝛾 ≥ 0, then 
the speed of convergence relates to conditional convergence, i.e. convergence in the rate of 
change of the indicators. The findings from the logt test enables us to determine whether 
convergence within the panel is present or not. In addition, the relative transition coefficients 
                                                          
6 See Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) for a detailed explanation and Rughoo and Sarantis (2014) and 
Matousek et al. (2014), for an application.  
 
can be plotted for a visual depiction of the convergent or non- convergent behaviour of the 
productivity indicators and the inefficiency scores for individual inputs.  
 
4. Data and Empirical results 
4.1. Data 
This study uses each bank’s financial data from BankScope. To select the input and output 
variable combination, we apply the intermediation approach to set the bank performance 
modelling. Generally, there are two approaches to model bank performance; the intermediate 
approach and the production approach. The main difference lies in the treatment of purchased 
funds. The former approach evaluates bank performance by focusing on both physical input 
and purchased funds. Meanwhile, the production approach focuses only on physical inputs but 
not so much on purchased funds. 
There have been extensive discussions on the different approaches of how to measure 
bank efficiency. Based on a large number of studies it is accepted that the intermediation 
approach has the upper hand in evaluating bank performance. The production approach is, on 
its part, appropriate in evaluating the financial performance of bank branches, for example see 
Berger and Humphrey (1997). Given that the objective of this research is to evaluate the 
financial performance of entire banks, we apply the intermediation approach to select the 
combination of input and output variables. The adoption of this approach is further supported 
by a number of empirical studies (See Sealey and Lindley, 1977, Fujii et al. 2014, Matousek et 
al, 2015).  
The selection of inputs and outputs follows the recent empirical studies on bank 
efficiency (See Matousek et al (2014), Assaf et al (2013), Shen et al (2009)). Thus, to estimate 
TE and CE using the DEA, we employ as input variables: total number of employees, fixed 
assets, and deposits. The following three output variables are used in our model: customer 
loans, other earning assets, and non-interest income, defined as net fees and commission and 
other operating income. 
In addition to the above data variables, the following three input price data are used to 
estimate CE: The price of labour is calculated as personnel expenses divided by the total 
number of employees. Price of funds is calculated as total interest expenses on deposits divided 
by total deposits. We use a proxy variable for price of capital which is calculated as the ratio 
of other operating expenses to total fixed assets. We obtain this data from BankScope database. 
Finally, we define total costs as the sum of interest expenses, personnel expenses and other 
operating expenses. 
In WRDDM estimation, following Matousek et al (2014), we apply the following three 
input variables: personnel expenses, fixed assets, and deposits. The three output variables are 
customer loans, other earning assets, and non-interest income. The data variable combination 
for each model are given in Table 1. 
The dataset covers 927 banks for the period 2005 to 2014, and all financial variables 
are deflated to 2010 prices. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2. To deepen our 
analysis, the banks are further divided into two groups, those located in the ‘old’ EU15 
countries and the rest based in the new EU countries.  
 
<Insert Tables 1 & 2> 
 
4.2. Bank efficiency analysis 
We report technical efficiency (TE), cost efficiency (CE), and allocative efficiency (AE) under 
the assumption of CRS and VRS in Table 3. The scores show the country and year average 
efficiency indicator from 2005 to 2014. All three efficiency indicator are defined from zero to 
one, and a larger score indicates better performance.  
From Table 3, it is noted that the highest TE scores are achieved on average in Ireland, 
Sweden, and Belgium which are part of EU15. The lowest TE scores are observed in Romania, 
Latvia, and Bulgaria. We find similar trends for the TE scores under both CRS and VRS 
assumptions. Additionally, high scale efficiency scores are observed in Sweden, Denmark, and 
Germany. Sweden and Denmark achieve high efficiency score in both TE and scale efficiency. 
These results imply that banks in Sweden and Denmark enjoy the maximum possible economy 
of scale. On the other hands, Banks in Germany achieve high scale efficiency while technical 
efficiency is not high. These results indicate that even though the size of the inputs and outputs 
in German banks is appropriate, the inputs are not being used as efficiently.   
We also report CE and AE in Table 3. The CE scores are very volatile across the countries 
and the banks from the new EU countries bear the lowest efficiency levels. Surprisingly, low 
CE scores are also observable for banks from Italy and Luxembourg. Notably, for Italian banks, 
as reported in Table 3, low CE and AE scores are noted while TE is at an average level. This 
implies that Italy’s banks’ AE is low due to low CE performance. Therefore, based on these 
results, we can argue that efforts to increase CE performance may prove to be more effective 
in boosting AE for banks in Italy.  
We also provide a comparison between bank efficiency levels in old and new EU countries 
in Table 3 and it is evident that new EU banks are on the average less efficient than banks from 
old EU countries. We examine the Kruskal-Wallis test to confirm the significant differences 
between the efficiency levels for new and old EU countries. The results reject the null 
hypothesis of equal bank efficiency among them. From Figure 1 and Table 3, it is evident that 
country group average score for TE and CE in new EU countries are still below bank efficiency 
scores in old EU countries under both CRS and VRS assumption. These results support 
previous empirical findings e.g., Kasman et al. (2013), Casu and Girardone (2010). These 
findings are interesting since the majority of banks in new EU countries are mostly owned by 
foreign banks. A closer look at Table 3, however, reveals that some countries from new EU 
such as Romania and Bulgaria are well below the average efficiency scores. Table 4 then 
provides an even more detailed analysis that lists annual efficiency scores.  
 
<Insert Figure 1> 
 
<Insert Table 3> 
 
Next, in Table 4 we provide bank efficiency scores over the observed time period. 
Interestingly, it is noted that TE fell in 2008 for the banks from EU15 but not for banks from 
the new EU countries. One possible interpretation of these results could come from the 
structure of loan which differs between old EU and new EU countries. Our results show that 
that the global financial crisis has had a negative impact on bank efficiency, and mainly on 
banks from the old EU. The majority of ‘old’ EU countries faced an unprecedented bailout and 
capital crunch that significantly deteriorated bank business activities. On the other hand, 
banking systems in most ‘new’ EU countries survived this period without any notable 
difficulties. One of the main reasons is that banks in ‘new’ EU countries had no or only 
marginal exposure to the structured financial products, in particular Collateral Debt Obligations 
and/or Credit Default Swaps that originated in USA. 
Additionally, Table 4 reports that TE and CE decreased rapidly from 2012 to 2013 in both 
‘new’ and ‘old’ EU countries. One likely interpretation of these results comes from the 
heightened financial risk from the Greek economic crisis. 
 
<Insert Table 4> 
 
Incidentally, based on the DEA estimation, we cannot identify which input factor actually 
worsened in both ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU countries. Therefore, we expand our analysis by using 
WRDDM to identify the specific input factor which led to a decreased bank performance. 
 
4.3. Productivity change and contribution effect of inputs 
Our model, as we have already indicated, enables us to analyse the effect of the utilised 
inputs on bank performance and productivity. Table 5 provides the inefficiency scores of the 3 
bank inputs we have employed. It is evident that deposits are optimally managed by banks with 
markedly low inefficiencies compared with personnel expenses and fixed assets. The average 
inefficiency level of all banks for personnel expenses and fixed assets achieved more than 0.7 
under both CRS and VRS assumption. This result implies that 70% of personnel expenses and 
fixed assets can be saved without decreasing outputs to achieve an efficient bank performance. 
Additionally we note that, not surprisingly, between the period 2007-2009, aggregate 
inefficiency scores increased for all the EU28 banks. Subsequently the aggregate inefficiency 
scores dipped but rose again from 2012 to 2013 due to a rapid increase in total deposits. This 
result reveals that the efficiency gap between efficient bank and inefficient bank became larger. 
These findings reflect the changes in bank behaviour during and after the financial crisis. The 
results suggests that bank liquidity concerns caused by the deteriorating quality of assets forced 
banks to reduce or completely stop their lending activities. . Indeed, as reported by the OECD 
(2012), with banks focusing on reducing their pre-crisis leverage levels and in anticipation of 
stricter regulatory capital requirements, bank lending has been lower.  
 
<Insert Table 5> 
 
We also report the disaggregated inefficiency scores separately for the banks from the ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ EU countries in Table 5. We note that the input inefficiency scores in 2005 are 
largely different between banks in EU15 and those in new EU countries, especially for the 
inefficiency scores for total deposits. However, the gap narrows down in 2013 and 2014. This 
is a key finding that demonstrate a process of catching up of banks from new EU countries with 
their counterparts in EU15.  
We analyse if the estimated inefficiency scores are statistically different among our two 
groups. The last row of Table 5 shows the p-value of Kruskal-Wallis test. The results reject the 
null hypothesis of equal inefficiency across these two groups of banks in many cases but the 
pattern is diverse. The inefficiency of fixed assets under CRS model and the inefficiency of 
personnel expenses under VRS model are found to be significantly different between the old 
and new EU countries. The interesting point is that the average inefficiency of fixed assets in 
old EU countries is larger than the new EU countries average in 2008, 2010, and 2011 and are 
statistically significant. One interpretation of this result is that fixed assets’ efficiency usage 
decreased due to the global financial crisis and this rendered the process of effective 
investments by large scale bank much more difficult.  Given that the CRS assumption includes 
both pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency of production, large banks with excess 
capital in old EU countries experienced higher inefficiency scores in the use of their fixed 
assets in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
Next, we discuss the productivity changes and contribution effect of inputs factors. TFP 
changes are analysed separately for old and new EU countries. Table 6 and 7 provide a 
description of not only TFP changes but also reports the input factors that contribute to TFP 
under CRS and VRS assumption, respectively. As one may expect old EU countries show 
negative values for the period 2007-2008 in both CRS and VRS assumption. This can be 
primarily explained through the negative impact of the global financial crisis. Interestingly, we 
note that this drop in TFP for banks from old EU countries results from a fall in the contribution 
effect of personnel expenses and total deposits during the crisis period. Post-2009, under both 
the CRS and VRS assumption, we note a marked increase in the positive contribution effect of 
total fixed assets and total deposits whilst the contribution effect of personnel expenses is very 
limited. Meanwhile, TFP scores in new EU countries show a gradual and consistent increase 
between 2007 to 2014. The contribution effect for all 3 inputs are positive and notably higher 
for total deposits. These overall results imply that the global financial crisis had a bigger 
negative impact on banks in old EU countries. These trends are consistent with the previous 
discussion wherein banks in new EU countries are seen to go through a catching up phase with 
the efficient banks. 
Next, we decompose TFP into Efficiency Change (EFFCH) and Technical Change 
(TECHCH). EFFCH measures changes in the position of a bank relative the frontier and 
TECHCH shows shifts in the production frontier. Fujii et al. (2014) provide a detailed 
discussion about the decomposition process. As for banks from old EU countries we observe 
that both components of TFP have negative values over the analysed period. In particular, all 
the values for efficiency change are negative throughout the whole period under both the CRS 
and VRS assumption for banks from old EU countries. As for technical change, the negative 
contribution effect mostly stems from personnel expenses. On the other hand, new EU 
countries show positive numbers that indicate positive technical change and efficiency change. 
In particular, EFFCH of banks from new EU countries under VRS assumption is clearly on a 
different trend compared to their counterparts in EU15. Once more, the contrasting impact of 
the global financial crisis on banks from the old EU countries on one hand and banks from the 
new EU countries is evident.  
 
 
<Insert Tables 6 and 7> 
 
4.4. Convergence 
In the following Section, we further investigate whether we can identify a common trend 
across EU countries in terms of productivity as well as in individual bank inputs. The 
convergence results on productivity and on the inefficiency scores for the individual inputs turn 
out to be quite revealing (see Table 8). For the whole sample of 927 banks from the EU28 
countries, we cannot detect any convergence for overall TFP at the 5% significance level. 
However, convergence is present for all EU28 banks in terms of both efficiency change (𝜸 
=1.570) and technical change (𝜸 =3.813). Given that 2 > 𝛾 ≥ 0 for efficiency change, the type 
of convergence here relates to conditional convergence, i.e. convergence in the rate of change. 
As for technical change, with 𝛾 ≥ 2, we note that convergence is in the level values. For the 
sample of banks from the old EU countries, we find no convergence for TFP (𝛾 = −2.955)  
and none for efficiency change ( 𝛾 = -1.150). However, strong convergence in levels is 
identified for technical change (𝛾 = 4.410). For the banks from the new EU countries, the 
trend is very similar to what we have noted for banks from the old EU. There is no convergence 
in TFP (𝜸 =-11.023) nor in efficiency change (𝜸 =-2.596). However, conditional convergence 
is present for technical change (𝜸 =1.905). The results clearly suggest that over the period 
2005-2014, convergence in EU 28 in technical change, i.e., where banks are experiencing a 
shift in their production frontier is being predominantly driven by banks from the old EU 
countries. Overall, this is a significant finding as firstly, it would signal that the sample of banks 
from EU28 are altogether integrating with respect to technical change but also secondly, that 
the banks from the new EU countries are catching up with their counterparts from the old EU 
countries in terms of technical change. Our results somewhat tally with those of Kasman et al 
(2013) 7  who find evidence of convergence among the 22 EU member countries plus 3 
candidate countries over an earlier period; 1995-2006. 
The convergence results on the inefficiency scores (see Table 8) for the individual inputs 
show that across the EU28 banks, there is no evidence of convergence for personnel expenses 
(x1) (𝜸 =-1.125) and total fixed assets (x2) (𝜸 =-1.054) while weak convergence is detected for 
total deposits (x3) (𝜸 =-0.363). When we split the sample into banks from the old EU countries 
and those from the new EU countries, the results are consistently similar. There is once more 
no convergence detected for personnel expenses and total fixed assets inefficiency scores while 
slow convergence is once more detected for total deposits (x3) (𝜸 =-0.362, 𝜸 =-0.360). These 
results tie in with the findings discussed in Section 4.3 wherein it is argued that that deposits 
are optimally managed by banks with low inefficiencies compared with personnel expenses 
and fixed assets. So overall, we can conclude that with respect to the banks’ individual inputs’ 
inefficiency scores, the picture of one of strong heterogeneity.  
 
<Insert Table 8> 
 
We also plot the transition paths, for 1) TFP, efficiency change and technical change and 
2) the individual inputs i.e. x1, x2, and x3 for the banks from the EU15 and new EU countries. 
Each transition path illustrates the behaviour of the transition coefficients vis-à-vis the panel 
average for each variable over the time period 2005-2014. Convergence is detected if the 
transition paths move asymptotically towards one. This procedure is insightful as it provides a 
                                                          
7 Kasman et al (2013) apply a different convergence methodology (the beta and sigma convergence method) and 
do not split their sample between the old and new EU member countries. 
visual image of the convergence or divergence process underway and also allows inferences to 
be drawn with regards to each variable’s behaviour.  
Figure 2 illustrates the paths of the transition parameters for TFP, efficiency change and 
technical change. The striking observation is the clear divergence observed in the paths for 
TFP, efficiency change and technical change over the periods 2007 to 2010 for both EU15 and 
new EU countries. We attribute this heterogeneous behaviour to the severe impact of the global 
financial crisis which started in 2007. We can also observe that the paths for technical change 
exhibit strong convergence behaviour as they move close to the cross-section average, from 
2011 and onwards. This behaviour underpins the logt results.  
 
<Insert Figure 2> 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the paths for the inefficiency scores for the individual inputs. The 
noticeable observation is that the paths for both the EU15 and new EU countries tend to show 
fairly heterogeneous behaviour from the start and throughout. These results tally with the 
findings from the group convergence findings. Additionally, we can observe heightened 
diversity around the financial crisis period and once again, the impact of the crisis seems 
evident.  
 
<Insert Figure 3> 
 
5. Conclusions  
This paper conducts a thorough empirical investigation of the convergence process in European 
retail banking sector by applying an innovative Weighted Russell Directional Distance Model. 
The analysis covers bank performance in the EU 28 countries for the period 2005 to 2014. The 
key contributions of this paper include the construction of three types of banking efficiency 
scores for all members of the European Union as well as the estimation of the disaggregated 
inefficiency scores for 3 bank inputs and finally the application of the Phillips and Sul (2007) 
convergence methodology, which detects the presence of convergence and provides an 
estimate of the speed of convergence.  
The paper reveals some important information that have policy implication for managers 
and regulators following the financial crisis. We demonstrate that bank efficiency has been 
undermined by the financial crisis in banks notably from old EU countries. We argue that bank 
efficiency and productivity in EU countries diverge across the banking sector. We further 
identify signs of an improvement in terms of efficiency and productivity in 2010. Nevertheless, 
we cannot verify if this is a trend. One would expect that the occurrence of the crisis and 
subsequent government interventions do distort the business environment in which banks 
operate.  
We extend the literature on European banking integration by testing for convergence in 
productivity and efficiency of European banks. We further our analysis and investigate the 
convergence in banks’ individual output. The use of the Phillips and Sul (2007) regression-
based test is a major contribution of this paper as this methodology not only detects the presence 
and degree of integration but also provides an estimate of the speed of convergence. It also 
provides a visual depiction of the integration process. 
Overall, the convergence results point to no group convergence in total factor productivity. 
However we find evidence of convergence in the components of the productivity indicator; i.e. 
efficiency change and, in particular, in technical change. For the latter, integration is clearly 
driven by strong convergent behaviour for technical change from the old EU countries’ banks. 
We find that the banks from the old EU countries are converging when analysing shifts in their 
production frontier while banks from the new EU countries are clearly catching up with their 
counterparts from the old EU countries. This signifies that continued investment in boosting 
the components of productivity at bank-level should eventually translate into further integration 
within the EU28 banking sector. It can further be argued that the detection of convergent 
behaviour in the components of the productivity indicator should fuel greater competition in 
the European banking sector, thus tying in with one of the policy objectives of the Single 
Market. Convergence in the inefficiency scores of individual inputs is almost non-existent 
during the period 2005-2014. These results are underpinned by the highly divergent behaviour 
of the transition paths, especially during the crisis years.  
Overall, the efficiency, productivity and convergence findings reveal gaping differences in the 
performance and behaviour of banks across the EU28. These present numerous challenges for 
policy-makers, regulators and practitioners in the EU. Undoubtedly, the results confirm that 
the global financial crisis has amplified the divergence process across EU banks. The key 
question is whether the current trend is only short-term or one that will be very difficult to 
reverse. There is anecdotal evidence that the performance and systemic stability of the banking 
sector are deeply embedded within the economic performance of the countries in questions. In 
particular, some of the ‘old’ EU countries face a further macroeconomic deterioration that will 
sooner or later be reflected in the stability and performance of the individual banks and the 
banking system as a whole. Our results unambiguously show that there are remarkable 
disparities in terms of bank performance. Thus, we may expect even further deepening of these 
systemic changes across EU banks. This could also further undermine the overall financial 
stability. 
So far we have witnessed a number of bank closure and intensified M&As activities of well-
established banks.  We may expect that EU authorities and financial regulators will face a 
second round of bank bail-outs, capitalisation and consolidation of the banking systems within 
the individual countries. Indeed, the current poor performance of many banks across the EU 
countries cannot be reversed without additional financial support.  The segment of the small 
and medium-sized banks is particularly vulnerable and sensitive to macroeconomic conditions.  
 
The global financial crisis has taught us that the depth and consequences of the crisis could not 
be reversed by having sophisticated regulators. Indeed, Basel II framework failed during the 
first test.  Our results do not also provide any evidence that the calls for strengthening the 
integration process by setting up pan-European supervisory body is a panacea for resolving 
poor bank performance and the divergence process. After all, the integration process of the 
banking sector has been taking place for almost three decades and the results still remain 
blurred.  
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Table 1. Data variable combination for each model 
 
 Input (x) Input price (p) Output (y) 
DEA 
model 
Technical 
efficiency 
(TE) 
1. Number of employees 
2. Fixed assets 
3. Deposits 
 
Not used 
1. Customer loans 
2. Other earning assets 
3. Non-interest income 
Cost 
efficiency 
(CE) 
1. Number of employees 
2. Fixed assets 
3. Deposits 
1. Price of labour 
2. Price of capital 
3. Price of funds 
1. Customer loans 
2. Other earning assets 
3. Non-interest income 
WRDDM 
1. Personal expenses 
2. Fixed assets 
3. Deposits 
 
Not used 
1. Customer loans 
2. Other earning assets 
3. Non-interest income 
 
 
Table 2. Data description 
 
 
 
Personnel 
expenses 
(Million EUR) 
Fixed assets 
(Million EUR) 
Deposits 
(Million EUR)  
Customer loans 
(Million EUR) 
Other earning 
assets 
(Million EUR) 
Total non-interest 
 income 
(Million EUR)  
Number of 
employees 
(Persons) 
Total cost 
(Million EUR) 
Year Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev  Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev  Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev 
2005      165           756       176           980      19,514        97,109       10,527      49,106      7,431      48,261          231         1,218       2,893      12,032         932,014      4,119,913  
2006      183           883       177           985      21,080      103,421       11,699      54,004      7,319      44,084          277         1,499       3,023      12,591      1,098,859      5,029,354  
2007      184           861       179           959      23,235      115,618       13,007      61,240      8,203      51,144          272         1,435       3,252      13,522      1,283,528      5,704,938  
2008      175           785       175           985      25,501      134,330       13,465      60,586      9,962      74,850          170            911       3,481      14,971      1,316,231      5,714,076  
2009      180           839       186        1,081      23,357      112,549       13,096      58,356      8,126      51,082          233         1,248       3,373      14,639      1,024,906      4,481,500  
2010      192           940       182        1,022      24,125      118,437       13,820      63,021      8,857      57,612          243         1,354       3,296      14,691      1,017,236      4,865,360  
2011      194           947       162           880      24,577      122,188       13,494      61,434      9,259      61,840          212         1,272       3,292      14,893      1,054,732      5,020,480  
2012      189           917       160           883      23,759      116,143       13,064      57,996      9,048      58,257          216         1,181       3,239      14,504      1,021,067      4,831,994  
2013      180           886       152           833      21,678      103,182       12,307      53,381      8,133      51,246          214         1,183       3,126      13,932         922,718      4,431,902  
2014      180           873       160           980      22,129      107,402        12,401      54,806      8,976      56,872          202         1,045        3,014      13,349         863,385      4,170,052  
Table 3. DEA efficiency scores by country 
        
Technical    
Cost efficiency   
Allocative 
Efficiency    efficiency 
   EU   TEcrs TEvrs 
Scale 
efficiency 
  
CEcrs CEvrs  AEcrs AEvrs 
  
GERMANY Old       0.561      0.601           0.939       0.351      0.376       0.622      0.620  
UNITED KINGDOM Old       0.627      0.770           0.833       0.415      0.621       0.645      0.784  
FRANCE Old       0.553      0.643           0.873       0.358      0.461       0.640      0.690  
SPAIN Old       0.671      0.861           0.797       0.426      0.626       0.643      0.717  
NETHERLANDS Old       0.611      0.755           0.815       0.463      0.609       0.743      0.775  
ITALY Old       0.591      0.705           0.850       0.287      0.372       0.486      0.519  
SWEDEN Old       0.742      0.765           0.975       0.446      0.490       0.593      0.627  
DENMARK Old       0.658      0.688           0.963       0.372      0.423       0.535      0.579  
BELGIUM Old       0.713      0.798           0.886       0.511      0.609       0.710      0.750  
FINLAND Old       0.664      0.912           0.733       0.399      0.728       0.615      0.799  
AUSTRIA Old       0.612      0.688           0.902       0.365      0.434       0.586      0.621  
IRELAND Old       0.770      0.946           0.814       0.489      0.606       0.667      0.648  
GREECE Old       0.508      0.744           0.705       0.348      0.480       0.690      0.650  
PORTUGAL Old       0.606      0.766           0.806       0.453      0.573       0.741      0.737  
LUXEMBOURG Old       0.406      0.545           0.730       0.286      0.419       0.653      0.758  
CZECH REPUBLIC New       0.599      0.694           0.878       0.414      0.457       0.683      0.674  
CYPRUS New       0.459      0.602           0.793       0.326      0.387       0.706      0.650  
POLAND New       0.527      0.794           0.672       0.363      0.480       0.687      0.610  
HUNGARY New       0.471      0.729           0.658       0.314      0.437       0.664      0.597  
ROMANIA New       0.323      0.471           0.733       0.207      0.264       0.652      0.571  
SLOVENIA New       0.533      0.624           0.866       0.355      0.385       0.659      0.619  
SLOVAKIA New       0.503      0.625           0.828       0.293      0.316       0.577      0.524  
LITHUANIA New       0.486      0.569           0.871       0.358      0.387       0.719      0.675  
MALTA New       0.565      0.664           0.858       0.360      0.385       0.633      0.585  
LATVIA New       0.367      0.416           0.882       0.226      0.266       0.588      0.628  
ESTONIA New       0.478      0.603           0.838       0.311      0.364       0.645      0.609  
CROATIA New       0.446      0.512           0.896       0.297      0.327       0.665      0.646  
BULGARIA New       0.380      0.442           0.877       0.281      0.300       0.734      0.686  
Country group average           
Old EU countries  814      0.584      0.649           0.909       0.362      0.420       0.613      0.635  
New EU countries  113      0.463      0.588           0.815       0.310      0.362       0.663      0.623  
Prob > |z|    0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000     0.039  
Note 1: Efficiency score is defined from zero to one and larger score represents better performance. 
Note 2:The Kruskal-Wallis test was applied to estimate probability as shown in the last row.   
  
Table 4 Average scores of DEA efficiency score for individual years 
   Technical efficiency  
Cost 
efficiency 
 Allocative 
efficiency 
  Year  TEcrs TEvrs 
Scale 
efficiency 
 CEcrs CEvrs  AEcrs AEvrs 
All 
bank 
(927) 
2005  0.642 0.684 0.940  0.406 0.443  0.628 0.640 
2006  0.593 0.651 0.917  0.389 0.431  0.652 0.655 
2007  0.594 0.648 0.923  0.424 0.474  0.712 0.725 
2008  0.569 0.636 0.909  0.424 0.480  0.742 0.749 
2009  0.593 0.659 0.912  0.365 0.427  0.615 0.641 
2010  0.574 0.645 0.904  0.334 0.400  0.582 0.612 
2011  0.563 0.638 0.897  0.330 0.397  0.582 0.609 
2012  0.615 0.679 0.912  0.347 0.400  0.559 0.576 
2013  0.485 0.601 0.832  0.283 0.357  0.580 0.579 
2014   0.464 0.575 0.833   0.251 0.322   0.537 0.546 
Old EU 
(814) 
2005  0.666 0.700 0.953  0.420 0.458  0.627 0.646 
2006  0.615 0.666 0.929  0.400 0.445  0.647 0.658 
2007  0.614 0.660 0.938  0.436 0.486  0.706 0.728 
2008  0.585 0.640 0.925  0.434 0.488  0.739 0.754 
2009  0.608 0.665 0.925  0.367 0.429  0.601 0.637 
2010  0.588 0.649 0.918  0.337 0.404  0.569 0.611 
2011  0.575 0.643 0.908  0.332 0.401  0.573 0.608 
2012  0.624 0.684 0.918  0.349 0.403  0.553 0.575 
2013  0.492 0.604 0.840  0.286 0.361  0.577 0.580 
2014   0.473 0.580 0.840   0.255 0.328   0.536 0.548 
New 
EU 
(113) 
2005  0.469 0.568 0.848  0.304 0.336  0.637 0.597 
2006  0.438 0.544 0.827  0.306 0.334  0.693 0.629 
2007  0.443 0.565 0.814  0.334 0.388  0.751 0.700 
2008  0.456 0.608 0.797  0.348 0.425  0.758 0.709 
2009  0.486 0.621 0.817  0.348 0.413  0.717 0.672 
2010  0.473 0.610 0.810  0.320 0.374  0.672 0.620 
2011  0.474 0.602 0.817  0.312 0.369  0.651 0.612 
2012  0.552 0.643 0.869  0.337 0.378  0.603 0.584 
2013  0.431 0.581 0.772  0.266 0.327  0.603 0.572 
2014   0.403 0.541 0.779   0.225 0.279   0.547 0.534 
Note: Efficiency score is defined from zero to one and a larger score represents better performance. 
 
  
Table 5 Disaggregated inefficiency score estimated by WRDDM 
  Constant return to scale (CRS)  Variable return to scale (VRS) 
  Year 
Aggregate 
inefficiency 
Personnel 
expenses 
Fixed 
assets 
Total 
deposit 
 Aggregate 
inefficiency 
Personnel 
expenses 
Fixed 
assets 
Total 
deposit 
All bank 
(927) 
2005 0.601 0.802 0.868 0.132  0.557 0.748 0.805 0.118 
2006 0.635 0.821 0.880 0.205  0.587 0.773 0.825 0.162 
2007 0.629 0.823 0.886 0.179  0.568 0.746 0.806 0.150 
2008 0.637 0.797 0.903 0.210  0.572 0.715 0.817 0.182 
2009 0.652 0.844 0.916 0.196  0.586 0.772 0.825 0.162 
2010 0.646 0.827 0.920 0.191  0.581 0.747 0.827 0.169 
2011 0.662 0.846 0.921 0.218  0.589 0.739 0.837 0.192 
2012 0.638 0.842 0.902 0.172  0.574 0.735 0.828 0.157 
2013 0.685 0.810 0.826 0.420  0.599 0.709 0.774 0.313 
2014 0.698 0.794 0.841 0.458   0.608 0.694 0.790 0.342 
Old EU 
(814) 
2005 0.588 0.796 0.864 0.105  0.542 0.735 0.795 0.096 
2006 0.625 0.814 0.878 0.183  0.573 0.759 0.816 0.143 
2007 0.620 0.818 0.884 0.157  0.555 0.733 0.798 0.135 
2008 0.630 0.793 0.904 0.192  0.563 0.705 0.813 0.172 
2009 0.646 0.838 0.916 0.183  0.579 0.763 0.821 0.152 
2010 0.638 0.822 0.921 0.171  0.571 0.733 0.821 0.158 
2011 0.655 0.844 0.923 0.199  0.580 0.727 0.832 0.181 
2012 0.631 0.836 0.902 0.156  0.563 0.721 0.822 0.146 
2013 0.678 0.797 0.823 0.413  0.590 0.690 0.765 0.314 
2014 0.689 0.779 0.837 0.451   0.598 0.675 0.781 0.339 
New EU 
(113) 
2005 0.692 0.846 0.899 0.330  0.665 0.845 0.874 0.275 
2006 0.710 0.868 0.895 0.368  0.688 0.871 0.889 0.304 
2007 0.697 0.861 0.895 0.334  0.658 0.845 0.864 0.265 
2008 0.686 0.828 0.894 0.337  0.631 0.793 0.847 0.253 
2009 0.700 0.886 0.921 0.293  0.641 0.837 0.855 0.231 
2010 0.703 0.860 0.914 0.334  0.656 0.846 0.877 0.246 
2011 0.706 0.855 0.908 0.355  0.653 0.821 0.869 0.268 
2012 0.689 0.885 0.899 0.284  0.648 0.836 0.874 0.233 
2013 0.741 0.910 0.847 0.465  0.662 0.844 0.836 0.306 
2014 0.759 0.899 0.868 0.511   0.683 0.829 0.857 0.362 
Prob > |z| 
 
(Old country vs 
New country) 
2005 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000  0.196 0.000 0.002 0.000 
2006 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.000  0.141 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.126  0.060 0.001 0.157 0.407 
2008 0.500 0.003 0.000 0.005  0.000 0.000 0.683 0.008 
2009 0.740 0.864 0.000 0.738  0.000 0.000 0.299 0.277 
2010 0.735 0.181 0.020 0.391  0.002 0.000 0.407 0.234 
2011 0.808 0.361 0.003 0.485  0.002 0.000 0.284 0.541 
2012 0.081 0.421 0.975 0.041  0.011 0.000 0.010 0.008 
2013 0.006 0.678 0.000 0.035  0.041 0.000 0.000 0.201 
2014 0.007 0.475 0.001 0.003  0.002 0.000 0.000 0.148 
Note1: Inefficiency score is defined from zero to one and a lower score represents better performance. 
Note2: Aggregated inefficiency score equals to the average of inefficiency score of the three inputs. 
 
  
Table 6. TFP change and contribution effect under CRS assumption 
 
year TFP 
Contribution effect of input 
 
EFFCH 
Contribution effect of input  
TECHCH 
Contribution effect of input 
  
personnel 
expenses 
total 
fixed 
assets 
total 
deposits 
 
personnel 
expenses 
total 
fixed 
assets 
total 
deposits 
 personnel 
expenses 
total 
fixed 
assets 
total 
deposits 
All 
bank 
(927) 
2005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2006 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 
-0.035 -0.006 -0.004 -0.024 
 
0.039 0.008 0.006 0.025 
2007 -0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.004 
 
-0.028 -0.007 -0.006 -0.016 
 
0.026 0.008 0.008 0.011 
2008 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 -0.006 
 
-0.036 0.002 -0.012 -0.026 
 
0.032 -0.002 0.014 0.020 
2009 0.006 0.000 0.004 0.001 
 
-0.052 -0.014 -0.016 -0.021 
 
0.057 0.014 0.020 0.022 
2010 0.011 0.001 0.005 0.005 
 
-0.045 -0.008 -0.017 -0.020 
 
0.056 0.009 0.022 0.024 
2011 0.014 0.001 0.008 0.005 
 
-0.061 -0.015 -0.018 -0.029 
 
0.075 0.016 0.025 0.034 
2012 0.023 0.002 0.011 0.010 
 
-0.038 -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 
 
0.060 0.015 0.022 0.023 
2013 0.026 0.002 0.012 0.012 
 
-0.085 -0.003 0.014 -0.096 
 
0.111 0.005 -0.002 0.108 
2014 0.032 0.003 0.014 0.015   -0.097 0.003 0.009 -0.109   0.128 -0.000 0.005 0.124 
Old 
EU 
(814) 
2005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2006 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 
-0.037 -0.006 -0.005 -0.026 
 
0.041 0.007 0.007 0.027 
2007 -0.005 -0.000 0.001 -0.006 
 
-0.032 -0.007 -0.007 -0.017 
 
0.027 0.007 0.008 0.012 
2008 -0.009 -0.002 0.001 -0.008 
 
-0.042 0.001 -0.013 -0.029 
 
0.033 -0.003 0.015 0.021 
2009 0.002 -0.000 0.004 -0.002 
 
-0.058 -0.014 -0.017 -0.026 
 
0.060 0.014 0.021 0.025 
2010 0.008 0.001 0.004 0.002 
 
-0.050 -0.009 -0.019 -0.022 
 
0.057 0.009 0.023 0.025 
2011 0.010 0.000 0.007 0.003 
 
-0.067 -0.016 -0.020 -0.031 
 
0.077 0.017 0.026 0.034 
2012 0.019 0.002 0.010 0.007 
 
-0.043 -0.013 -0.013 -0.017 
 
0.062 0.015 0.023 0.024 
2013 0.023 0.002 0.011 0.010 
 
-0.090 -0.000 0.013 -0.103 
 
0.113 0.002 -0.002 0.113 
2014 0.029 0.002 0.013 0.013   -0.101 0.005 0.009 -0.115   0.130 -0.003 0.004 0.129 
New 
EU 
(113) 
2005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2006 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.003 
 
-0.019 -0.007 0.001 -0.013 
 
0.024 0.009 -0.001 0.015 
2007 0.018 0.005 0.006 0.007 
 
-0.005 -0.005 0.001 -0.001 
 
0.023 0.010 0.005 0.009 
2008 0.030 0.009 0.010 0.011 
 
0.005 0.006 0.002 -0.002 
 
0.024 0.002 0.008 0.014 
2009 0.032 0.005 0.008 0.019 
 
-0.009 -0.014 -0.007 0.012 
 
0.040 0.018 0.016 0.007 
2010 0.037 0.005 0.010 0.022 
 
-0.011 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 
 
0.048 0.010 0.015 0.023 
2011 0.045 0.007 0.014 0.024 
 
-0.015 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 
 
0.060 0.010 0.017 0.032 
2012 0.047 0.003 0.016 0.027 
 
0.003 -0.013 -0.000 0.015 
 
0.044 0.016 0.016 0.012 
2013 0.048 0.003 0.016 0.029 
 
-0.049 -0.021 0.017 -0.045 
 
0.097 0.024 -0.001 0.074 
2014 0.052 0.005 0.019 0.028   -0.068 -0.018 0.010 -0.060   0.119 0.022 0.009 0.088 
Note1: Accumulated productivity indicators and contribution effect scores are standardized with the year 
2005 equal to zero. 
Note2: Each productivity indicator score equals to the sum of contribution effects of inputs. 
  
Table 7. TFP change and contribution effect under VRS assumption 
 
year TFP 
Contribution effect of input 
 
EFFCH 
Contribution effect of input  
TECHCH 
Contribution effect of input 
  
personnel 
expenses 
total 
fixed 
assets 
total 
deposits 
 
personnel 
expenses 
total 
fixed 
assets 
total 
deposits 
 personnel 
expenses 
total 
fixed 
assets 
total 
deposits 
All 
bank 
(927) 
2005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2006 0.011 0.003 0.007 0.002 
 
-0.030 -0.008 -0.007 -0.015 
 
0.041 0.011 0.013 0.016 
2007 0.005 0.002 0.006 -0.003 
 
-0.011 0.001 -0.000 -0.011 
 
0.016 0.002 0.007 0.007 
2008 -0.005 -0.003 0.004 -0.006 
 
-0.015 0.011 -0.004 -0.021 
 
0.010 -0.014 0.008 0.016 
2009 0.007 -0.001 0.006 0.002 
 
-0.029 -0.008 -0.007 -0.015 
 
0.036 0.007 0.013 0.016 
2010 0.015 0.000 0.010 0.005 
 
-0.024 0.000 -0.008 -0.017 
 
0.040 -0.000 0.017 0.022 
2011 0.017 -0.000 0.012 0.005 
 
-0.032 0.003 -0.011 -0.025 
 
0.049 -0.003 0.022 0.030 
2012 0.026 0.001 0.016 0.009 
 
-0.017 0.004 -0.008 -0.013 
 
0.043 -0.003 0.024 0.022 
2013 0.032 0.002 0.019 0.012 
 
-0.042 0.013 0.010 -0.065 
 
0.074 -0.011 0.008 0.077 
2014 0.038 0.003 0.021 0.014   -0.051 0.018 0.005 -0.075   0.089 -0.015 0.016 0.089 
Old 
EU 
(814) 
2005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2006 0.012 0.004 0.007 0.001 
 
-0.031 -0.008 -0.007 -0.016 
 
0.043 0.012 0.014 0.017 
2007 0.004 0.003 0.007 -0.006 
 
-0.013 0.001 -0.001 -0.013 
 
0.017 0.002 0.008 0.007 
2008 -0.010 -0.005 0.004 -0.009 
 
-0.021 0.010 -0.006 -0.025 
 
0.011 -0.015 0.010 0.016 
2009 0.002 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 
 
-0.037 -0.009 -0.009 -0.019 
 
0.039 0.008 0.014 0.017 
2010 0.012 -0.000 0.010 0.002 
 
-0.029 0.000 -0.008 -0.021 
 
0.041 -0.001 0.019 0.023 
2011 0.013 -0.001 0.012 0.002 
 
-0.038 0.003 -0.012 -0.028 
 
0.051 -0.004 0.024 0.030 
2012 0.023 0.001 0.016 0.007 
 
-0.021 0.005 -0.009 -0.017 
 
0.044 -0.004 0.025 0.024 
2013 0.030 0.002 0.019 0.010 
 
-0.048 0.015 0.010 -0.073 
 
0.078 -0.013 0.009 0.083 
2014 0.037 0.003 0.021 0.013   -0.056 0.020 0.005 -0.081   0.093 -0.017 0.017 0.094 
New 
EU 
(113) 
2005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2006 0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.005 
 
-0.023 -0.008 -0.005 -0.010 
 
0.028 0.008 0.006 0.015 
2007 0.018 0.001 0.003 0.013 
 
0.007 0.000 0.003 0.003 
 
0.011 0.001 -0.000 0.010 
2008 0.031 0.006 0.008 0.018 
 
0.033 0.017 0.009 0.007 
 
-0.002 -0.011 -0.001 0.010 
2009 0.040 0.005 0.010 0.024 
 
0.024 0.003 0.006 0.015 
 
0.016 0.003 0.004 0.009 
2010 0.036 0.002 0.008 0.026 
 
0.009 -0.000 -0.001 0.010 
 
0.028 0.003 0.008 0.017 
2011 0.044 0.005 0.013 0.027 
 
0.012 0.008 0.002 0.002 
 
0.032 -0.003 0.011 0.024 
2012 0.047 0.003 0.017 0.026 
 
0.017 0.003 -0.000 0.014 
 
0.030 0.000 0.017 0.012 
2013 0.047 0.003 0.018 0.025 
 
0.002 0.000 0.013 -0.010 
 
0.045 0.003 0.006 0.036 
2014 0.047 0.005 0.019 0.023   -0.018 0.005 0.006 -0.029   0.065 -0.001 0.013 0.052 
Note1: Accumulated productivity indicators and contribution effect scores are standardized with the year 
2005 equal to zero. 
Note2: Each productivity indicator score equals the sum of contribution effects of inputs. 
 
  
Table 8: Phillips and Sul Logt convergence test on productivity indicator and inefficiency score 
of individual inputs 
 
 
All EU (28)  Old EU (15)  New EU (13) 
 γ t-stat   γ t-stat   γ t-stat 
TFP -2.976 -2.204 *  -2.955 -3.092*  -11.023 -6.893* 
EFFCH 1.570 0.898  -1.150 -29.551*  -2.596 -4.345* 
TECHCH 3.813 1.968  4.410 1.686  1.905 1.341 
         
Personnel 
expenses 
-1.125 -23.181*  -1.130 -33.045*  -1.037 -5.448* 
Fixed asset -1.054 -16.417*  -1.066 -18.792*  -0.849 -2.529* 
Deposits -0.363 -0.681  -0.362 -0.630  -0.360 -1.324 
Note:* Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence at the 5% significance level. 
  
Figure 1 Bank efficiency scores 
  
 Figure 2 Transition paths for TFP and efficiency /technical change 
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 Figure 3 Transition paths for inefficiency scores for individual inputs x1, x2 and x3 
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